As the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) plays an increasingly important role in all fields, the US and Western Europe are more concerned at its development direction while neighboring countries such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and even Turkey have expressed willingness to join the bloc.

The SCO’s predecessor is the Shanghai Five mechanism, which was established on April 26, 1996, with the signing of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai by the heads of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2001 at its annual summit in Shanghai, the five member nations admitted Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Five mechanism. All six heads of state then signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on June 15, 2001. As a new type of regional organization, the SCO affirmed its committment to safeguarding regional peace, security and stability.

As the SCO's interactions with other countries and the international community become increasingly frequent, problems regarding the bloc’s expansion have gradually emerged.

India's ambassador to Russia expressed willingness for India to join the SCO at its June 2002 summit in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Mongolia became the first country to receive observer status at the 2004 summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. India, Pakistan and Iran received observer status at the 2005 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. Belarus and Sri Lanka were granted dialogue partner status in the SCO at the 2009 summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Afghanistan received observer status and Turkey was granted dialogue status at the 2012 summit in Beijing.

Additionally, the SCO has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with international and regional organizations, such as the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is an observer in the UN General Assembly and has established a contact group with Afghanistan. In this context, expansion of the SCO has drawn wide attention.

The SCO is cautious about its expansion. It has successively passed related documents on expansion, but has never put forward any project for confirming new member nations.

In truth, the SCO’s expansion may bring benefits in fields such as politics, security, economy and energy.

Firstly, the SCO may expand its scale and promote its influence and discourse power. India is not only outstanding in high and new technology, but also has powerful impact in South Asia. If India joins the SCO, three countries in the BRICS will be included.

This will undoubtedly greatly expand international influence of the SCO. Meanwhile, once India and Afghanistan become member nations, the SCO will deepen its ties with the ASEAN. The South Asian Alliance, which includes India and Pakistan, will also be enhanced. In addition, as a regional cooperation organization with a long history and remarkable achievements, the ASEAN may provide useful experience for the SCO's development.

Next, accepting other countries will reflect the openness of the SCO, providing more opportunities for China and the SCO to exert international influence. Existing and new members in the framework of the SCO are all located on the ancient Silk Road, and most of them are China's neighboring countries. The SCO will provide a cooperative mechanism for China's building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and strategy of neighboring diplomacy.

An enlarged SCO will promote complementary interests among energy-exporting countries, importing countries and transfer countries. Existing applicant states include oil-rich Iran, petroleum-dependent India, and Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have vital energy-transporting routes. If the SCO accepts Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, its inner petroleum storage volume will grow.

Moreover, new members may introduce new cooperative concepts to the SCO. Organization mechanisms will be further perfected in the SCO. Exchanges in funds, resources and technology among member nations will be enlarged.

Compared with anticipated benefits, risk caused by enlargement to the SCO is hard to be accurately estimated.

Firstly, influenced by the SCO's decision-making mechanism, expansion will weaken cohesion of the organization. As a result of enlargement, there will be obvious diversity between member nations and opinions from different members will more likely diverge.

Secondly, expansion will weaken cooperation in issue areas between member nations. Issue areas mean areas in which an organization strives to solve problems through cooperation. Since the SCO was established in 2001, its cooperation fields have expanded, ranging from security to politics, economy and humanity. Now, the SCO is developing in the direction of comprehensive cooperation in all fields. Meanwhile, every member has its own concrete interests, which don't completely align with overall interests of the mechanism. Expansion will further increase divergences in some cooperative fields and even lead to disbanding the organization.

Thirdly, the SCO's emergency capability is weak due to a lack of necessary means of invention and action. The SCO is usually helpless when its members encounter emergency events, such as regime change or ethnic conflict. An international organization with low efficiency and weak foundation easily encounters the dilemma of collective action as its members increase. This is the situation the enlarged SCO may be faced with. If the SCO accepts more members, its complex structure will make it more difficult for the SCO to coordinate ties between its members. Furthermore, accepting Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Iran may result in the focus of security cooperation of the SCO retransferring to traditional security from non-traditional security. Addressing threats of traditional security from new members will greatly expend the SCO's security resources.

Fourthly, economic situations of member states are closely related to the future development of the SCO. Problems faced by Central Asian countries during their transition process have objectively affected the implementation of relevant projects in the framework of the SCO. Central Asian countries usually need help from China. To date, most funds in the SCO's economic projects are from loans provided by China. For the SCO's future development, accepting new members capable of implementing documents and treaties signed by the organization is very important. Except for India as an economic power, applicant countries have floundering economies and some are even embroiled in turmoil or civil war.

Divergence between China and Russia is also key hurdle to SCO expansion. China and Russia both have a cautious attitude towards expansion due partly to competition between the two sides in Central Asia. They have different opinions about whether the SCO needs to expand and which countries may be accepted as its members. Russia hopes to restrict China with the help of other countries, while China expects to effectively maintain its status in the SCO.

The SCO may provide an negotiated platform for member states with disputes, but shouldn't make it a tool for intervening in Central Asian countries' internal affairs. Meanwhile, SCO expansion should be based on every mechanism in the organization being perfected and inner problems being resolved.

With complex anti-separatism efforts in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the SCO has undertaken the important mission of ensuring other member nations firmly back China's struggle against Xinjiang separatists. In fact, China has achieved great breakthroughs in neighboring diplomacy conducted in the western region, gaining firm support and active coordination from western neighboring countries in campaigns against independence movements in Xinjiang and the Tibet Autonomous Region. To this end, the SCO has played an irreplaceable role. The SCO is of strategic significance in China's national security and stability in Xinjiang. Managing the SCO well and intensifying its internal construction conforms to China's fundamental interests.

Zeng Xianghong is from the Institute for Central Asian Studies at Lanzhou University. Li Tingkang is from the School of Political Communication at Central China Normal University.

Translated by Yu Hui

Revised by Tom Fearon