The Lugou Bridge Photo: Zhan Chensheng/CSST

Renya Mutaguchi was a pivotal figure in the Lugou Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 [recognized as the start of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China, and China’s whole-nation resistance against the Japanese invaders]. Born in 1888 in Saga Prefecture, Japan, Mutaguchi was a career military officer who served for many years in the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office. The Japanese North China Area Army, to which Mutaguchi was posted, was a product of the Xinchou Treaty of 1901, which granted Japan the right to station troops in the Beijing–Tianjin area. In April 1936, Mutaguchi was appointed commander of the First Infantry Regiment of that garrison. The Third Battalion of this regiment, stationed in Fengtai, Beijing, was the unit responsible for triggering the Lugou Bridge Incident.

During and after the war, Mutaguchi authored no fewer than six essays purporting to reveal the “truth” about the incident. These writings have been treated by Japanese right-wing circles as eyewitness testimony from the “scene of history,” used to substantiate the claim that Japan was drawn into war “passively” and without premeditation. But what kind of “truth” did Mutaguchi construct through these narratives—and what distortions lay behind it?

Fabricating ‘provocation–retaliation’ narrative

Mutaguchi himself was a beneficiary of the Lugou Bridge Incident. Lauded by the Japanese media as a “national hero” for his alleged bravery during the event, he was promoted from the rank of colonel to major general within six months following the incident. In late June 1938, he was invited to contribute a written statement to a roundtable discussion commemorating the first anniversary of the incident, hosted by the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. In this piece, Mutaguchi fabricated the core cause of the incident, attributing it to anti-Japanese sentiment within Chinese 29th Corps garrisoned in Beijing and the Chinese troops’ contempt toward Japanese forces.

Mutaguchi recounted numerous details—such as on the night of July 7—when the commander of the Third Battalion, Kiyonao Ichiki, reported hearing mysterious gunfire during a drill near the Yongding River and noticed the “disappearance of one soldier” from the Eighth Company. Mutaguchi immediately concluded that Chinese forces were responsible and ordered Japanese troops stationed in Fengtai to seize the strategic high ground on the east side of the Lugou Bridge—Sha Gang—and await further orders in combat formation. On the morning of July 8, upon hearing Ichiki’s report of a “second shot,” Mutaguchi ordered his troops to prepare for battle, declaring that it was an intolerable affront to their army’s dignity and they must decisively punish the Chinese forces’ unlawful conduct.

Evidently, Mutaguchi’s version of the “truth” was crafted around a “provocation–retaliation” framework, shifting blame for the outbreak of hostilities onto the Chinese side.

Revealing essence of aggression

In August 1940, Mutaguchi was promoted to lieutenant general, joining the upper echelons of the Japanese military leadership. By this time, domestic voices in Japan had begun to question the official narrative, suggesting the Lugou Bridge Incident had in fact been orchestrated by Japan. In response, he published a speech titled “Recollections on the Outbreak of the Incident” in a Japanese magazine. Though he continued to blame China for the incident, he now revealed—perhaps to boast of his battlefield achievements—certain details indicating the premeditated nature of Japan’s actions.

In the speech, Mutaguchi admitted that on the eve of the incident, he had insisted on holding a grand military “Colors Festival” in Beiping (Beijing), parading his troops through the city in a show of force, thereby provoking the Chinese 29th Corps. Under such conditions, he wrote, “relations between the two sides deteriorated rapidly.” His account described how he humiliated Wang Lengzhai, the magistrate of Wanping County, by refusing to acknowledge his authority and showing no intention of a peaceful resolution. After receiving the report of a “second shot” from Ichiki, Mutaguchi concluded that the Chinese side could no longer be tolerated and proclaimed: “This marks a grave moment for Japan. In fact, the decision to act was mine alone; consulting a superior would only shift the responsibility.” His statements revealed a strong desire for personal glory and historical recognition.

Mutaguchi also admitted that the real objective of the repeated Japanese exercises along the Yongding River was to seize both the Lugou Bridge and Wanping County. The Japanese had meticulously surveyed the area in advance, and at 5 a.m. on July 8, their first artillery shell struck the Chinese bunker at Longwang Temple with pinpoint accuracy.

In April 1941, Mutaguchi authored a set of notes titled “The Truth About the Outbreak of the China Incident and Surrounding Circumstances” for use in military education. As this was an internal document for Japanese officers, he disclosed the Japanese military’s strategy of exploiting China-Japan tensions in North China. He emphasized: “Despite our numerical disadvantage, we had to rely primarily on field operations, making it essential for the entire regiment to master dusk, dawn, and nighttime maneuvers. Every soldier had to familiarize himself with the terrain.” “Drills were conducted using sand tables and maps, and simulations were used to determine equipment and formations for actual deployments.”

He added that every soldier carried 30 live rounds during exercises, messengers were equipped with pistols, and robust communication protocols were enforced. Recalling the moment he first heard the report of gunfire, he wrote, “My first thought was, ‘It has finally happened.’” He was immediately seized by what he called “a burning determination for battle.”

Mutaguchi unabashedly described the Lugou Bridge Incident as a “heaven-sent opportunity” for Japan to resolve the “China problem.” Upon hearing the “second shot,” he felt a surge of urgency and ordered the attack, reflecting later: “I felt deeply grateful for having experienced this transcendent moment. That very responsibility elevated an ordinary man like me to something sacred.”

Eloquent excuses cannot conceal aggression reality

In December 1945, Mutaguchi was detained in Sugamo Prison by the Allied forces as a suspected war criminal. In early April 1946, he penned a confession titled “The Truth Behind the Outbreak of the Lugou Bridge Incident.” By this time, not only was he concerned about the Allies uncovering the truth, but he also had to contend with emerging criticism in the Japanese media that the incident had been a conspiracy orchestrated by Japan. Seeking to deflect responsibility for provoking the war, he deliberately revisited what he claimed was the “truth” of the event.

He repeatedly emphasized the Japanese army’s supposed “restraint under pressure,” claiming he had specifically instructed those handling negotiations with the Chinese to exercise restraint, even in the face of provocation. He recounted telling Wang Lengzhai, “Regardless of whether you have the authority, for the sake of China-Japan friendship, please restrain your troops and resolve this through negotiation.” Upon hearing the report of the “second shot,” Mutaguchi feigned reluctance, concluding that further forbearance would embolden the Chinese army and erode the Japanese army’s authority. Thus, he said, Japan had no choice but to invoke the right to self-defense.

To Mutaguchi, the incident was a defensive reaction by Japanese forces to “Chinese provocations”: “We bore with it like soothing a mischievous child, always seeking peaceful solutions. I think this account helps others understand. As the Japanese proverb goes, ‘Even the most patient person can only endure three times.’ The Lugou Bridge Incident occurred under precisely such circumstances.”

In December 1956, Maru magazine published Mutaguchi’s reflective essay “The Lugou Bridge Incident Shrouded in Mystery.” By then, he had returned to civilian life. Yet in the article, he continued to deny Japanese responsibility for initiating the incident, absurdly claiming that the Japanese army treated the Chinese 29th Crops as a “friendly force,” which simply misunderstood and provoked them repeatedly. He deliberately distorted the purpose and conduct of Japanese military exercises, arguing that the Japanese army in China was training for potential war with the Soviet Union and thus focused on night maneuvers—leading, he claimed, to Chinese “misinterpretations.”

Selective testimony and historical distortion

Mutaguchi’s wartime and postwar writings are marked by a strong tone of self-justification. They represent selective and self-serving narratives of historical events, revealing the cunning of a militarist who evades culpability with eloquent rationalization. His four wartime essays primarily aimed to boast of his valor and leadership. His two postwar writings were crafted to conceal or distort the fact that he and his unit were responsible for initiating hostilities.

From being lauded as a national hero during wartime to becoming a suspected war criminal in the postwar years, Mutaguchi repeatedly revised his own testimony to construct a version of the Lugou Bridge Incident that favored both himself and the Japanese military. Notably, all his writings reference the Fengtai incidents before the Lugou Bridge Incident, which he repeatedly cited as a lesson that influenced his decision to issue a combat order on the morning of July 8—encouraging readers to believe that “the Chinese provoked the event due to rising anti-Japanese sentiment, and that Japan simply reached its limit.”

During the Cold War, Mutaguchi blamed the incident on the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s “propaganda work” targeting the 29th Crops, echoing the claims of right-wing Japanese historians who portrayed the CPC as the instigator. This narrative aligned with anti-Communist rhetoric in both Japanese and American right-wing discourse.

Ultimately, Mutaguchi’s testimony has served as a “valuable asset” for Japanese right-wing efforts to revise the history of Japan’s full-scale war of aggression against China. While his writings were crafted in self-defense, they nonetheless reveal critical clues: These statements shed light on the Japanese military’s calculated provocations and escalation of tension following the Lugou Bridge Incident, aimed at forcibly resolving the “China problem,” while also indicating that Japan’s preparations to transition from exercises to actual combat had been made in advance. It is no surprise, then, that when the first shot rang out at the Lugou Bridge, Mutaguchi would exclaim: “It has finally happened.”

Wang Meng is a professor from the School of History at Wuhan University.