In Chinese culture, mianzi has rich connotations and is associated with concepts such as self-esteem, vanity, shyness, flattery, shamelessness, morality, and performance. Photo: TUCHONG 

To assess whether an independent knowledge system can be said to exist, the first criterion is whether it possesses its own concepts. Without conceptual foundations, even the most vigorously promoted knowledge system remains largely rhetorical—after a brief period of enthusiasm, it will inevitably lose momentum and fail to achieve substantive progress. The imperative for Chinese social sciences to build an independent knowledge system arises precisely because, for a long time, the disciplines have relied heavily on concepts drawn from other knowledge systems. Since the reform and opening up, Chinese social sciences have made notable progress, yet concepts and theories that are distinctly China’s own remain relatively scarce. Given disciplinary differences, this article focuses primarily on indigenous concepts in sociology.

Difficulties of developing indigenous concepts in sociology

At present, the construction of indigenous concepts takes roughly three forms. The first consists of concepts inherited from Chinese intellectual history, such as ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (ritual propriety), xiao (filial piety), zhong (loyalty), he (harmony), xin (trustworthiness), qing (emotion), zhi (will), zhongyong (the Doctrine of the Mean), and lun (ethical relations). These concepts constituted the core of the ancient Chinese knowledge system and serve as evidence that China once possessed its own intellectual tradition. Since the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), with the eastward spread of Western learning, this body of knowledge has been subsumed under the category of “national studies” (guoxue), implicitly marking a boundary between it and contemporary social sciences.

The second form involves identifying and refining terms drawn from everyday language, such as guanxi (relationships), renqing (interpersonal norms), mianzi (face), gift-giving, affection, fate, reciprocity, family, and “one of us.” Among these, guanxi, renqing, and especially mianzi have attracted the most scholarly attention. Research on mianzi, in particular, has gained visibility in Western sociology, social psychology, intercultural communication, and communication studies.

The third form consists of original concepts proposed by Chinese scholars. The most influential example is sociologist Fei Xiaotong’s chaxu geju (“differential mode of association”), alongside others such as anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu’s “situation-centeredness” and philosopher Liang Shuming’s “ethics-oriented framework.”

Among these three forms, philosophically oriented concepts are the most substantial in intellectual weight, yet they largely remain confined to philosophy and ethics and have difficulty entering sociology. Some recently revived concepts, such as zhongyong, lun, and li, have yet to gain substantial influence. The relative vitality of the second form indicates its connection to the empirical tractability of social science research. However, as newly articulated concepts, they face two major tests before gaining academic acceptance: time, and broad scholarly acceptance. These challenges underscore the difficulty of establishing an independent knowledge system. At present, only the “differential mode of association” can be considered a standout achievement in Chinese sociology. Moreover, indigenous concepts often face theoretical obstacles—including difficulties of definition and empirical investigation—which further hinder their development.

Many Chinese concepts either lack clear definitions or do not require them. When scholars discuss research problems in Chinese, they share a common cultural background and a tacitly understood lifeworld, which provides a shared context that enables mutual comprehension without explicit definition. Once this shared cultural context is absent, however, the vagueness and arbitrariness of such concepts become apparent. For example, while those living in China can intuitively grasp the meaning and situational use of mianzi, it remains difficult to define it precisely in academic terms. Refraining from formal definition may be understood as a common feature of Chinese intellectual tradition. Another point worth noting is that Chinese understandings of concepts tend to be intuitive. Confucius himself did not define key concepts; when different disciples asked about ren, his answers were always concrete and varied, leaving space for later development within Confucian thought. In short, Chinese scholarship’s approaches to conceptual understanding differ from Western traditions grounded in formal logic. For this reason, identifying appropriate ways to define concepts constitutes a central challenge in constructing an independent knowledge system.

Traditional Chinese scholarship approached meaning through philology, semantic exegesis, annotation, and textual criticism. Proceeding along these paths rarely involved asking how indigenous concepts might be developed into propositions, models, or theories. This may explain why an independent Chinese knowledge system is more likely to emerge from the humanities than from the social sciences: No matter how Westernized the humanities become, they necessarily entail reinterpretation and reorganization of Chinese thought, history, and classical texts, thus maintaining continuity with their intellectual roots. The social sciences, by contrast, focus on modern society—markets, institutions, stratification, migration, and social interaction. Researchers can rely on experiments, case studies, or data without necessarily returning to historical thought or classical texts. Nevertheless, social scientists engaged in building an independent knowledge system must recognize that the study of modern society also entails the construction of local knowledge. Markets, institutions, stratification, population mobility, and social relations are deeply intertwined with characteristics inherited from Chinese civilization. Social modernities that appear similar may in fact embody distinct modes of thinking and interaction, governed by different underlying logics.

Concept-building as starting point of independent knowledge system

Developing indigenous concepts is undoubtedly difficult, so why must this be the point of departure? The importance of indigenous concepts lies not only in clarifying what is to be studied and delineating the scope and direction of scholarly inquiry, but more importantly, in reconnecting research with its own intellectual lineage. As Henry Rosemont Jr. and Roger T. Ames have noted in their studies of Confucian concepts, context often manifests in the form of a “concept-cluster.” Forcibly dismantling such a cluster—extracting a single concept from its original context and interpreting it within another—may yield a sense of analytical novelty or even “insight,” but will not yield an accurate understanding of one’s own society and culture. At present, the greatest challenge in studying indigenous concepts lies in how to engage with them empirically. Accordingly, the author is currently experimenting with linguistic approaches, concept-cluster analysis, and the construction of research frameworks, and offers several brief examples below.

The rich connotations of mianzi cannot be derived from literal interpretation alone. Relevant research may draw on both philology and modern structuralist methods of classification. Whether Chinese notions of “face” distinguish between lian (face) and mianzi should not be decided intuitively, but through systematic analysis of everyday expressions. For lian, such expressions include “fighting for face,” “winning honor,” “showing backbone”; “losing face,” “losing one’s reputation,” “making a fool of oneself”; and “having no shame,” “being shameless,” and so on. For mianzi, common expressions include “caring about face,” “giving face,” “showing support,” “giving someone an out,” and “undermining someone in public.” Through such arrangements, it becomes possible to discern what Chinese notions of face are actually expressing.

Positivist approaches often attempt to operationalize the concept of face by designing measurement scales. Yet how can face be quantified? Conceptions and practices related to face operate at multiple levels—personality, interaction, individuals, organizations, regions, and even nations. Attributes such as self-esteem, vanity, shyness, flattery, shamelessness, morality, and performance all bear traces of face. If face is decomposed into numerous variables operationalized through these attributes, does the resulting measurement still capture the notion of face? Clearly, the meaning of face lies less in an operational definition required by empirical research than in the context provided by the concept itself.

Concept-cluster analysis can be illustrated through the example of mingfen (name and status). Previous studies have tended to analyze mingfen using concepts such as status, identity, rank, or differentiation, often concluding merely that traditional Chinese society placed great importance on hierarchy and identity. Such analyses lack contextual grounding and fail to achieve genuine understanding. Studying mingfen requires primarily identifying its surrounding concept cluster: How do ritual systems relate to mingfen? How do notions of self and field embedded in concepts such as status and role connect to mingfen? Are these concepts transformed in its expression? Only by comparing clusters composed of concepts such as occupation, identity, status, role, personality, self, and field with those surrounding mingfen can we determine whether mingfen corresponds to commonly used sociological concepts, and whether such substitutions can truly capture its importance in Chinese politics and society.

In Western scholarship, concepts are expected to be clearly defined, and elaborate methodological, logical, and empirical tools have been developed for this purpose. Such traditions are largely absent from China’s own scholarly heritage. Yet the inspiration offered by traditional Chinese scholarship lies elsewhere: in its emphasis on contextual understanding and concept clusters, inherited from philological practice, and in their potential contribution to constructing indigenous knowledge. Even if operationalization is ultimately required, it should be grounded in this contextual work, rather than achieved through the mechanical application of imported theories and concepts. Every knowledge system is articulated through a particular language. Abandoning one’s own language in pursuit of a supposedly universal knowledge through translation may appear rational, but it is in fact an illusion of epistemic homogenization. Drawing on the distinctive features of the Chinese language to define indigenous concepts, grasp their contexts, and study their concept clusters may offer a more viable path toward building an independent knowledge system.

Zhai Xuewei is a professor from the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Nanjing University. This article has been edited and excerpted from China Social Science Review, Issue 3, 2025.