Unitree GD01 manned transformable mecha robot, displayed at WAIC in Shanghai on July 17th Photo: IC PHOTO

From July 17 to 20, the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance (WAIC 2026) was held in Shanghai. Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony and delivered a keynote speech, drawing considerable attention from international academic circles.

The widening gap between technological progress and institutional adaptation has become one of the most urgent governance challenges of the digital age. At the heart of WAIC 2026 was a central question: How can AI be developed for good and for all? For developing countries on the other side of the digital divide, two concerns loom particularly large: whether the AI revolution will narrow or deepen existing inequalities, and how they can move from passive recipients of technology to active participants with digital sovereignty and development rights. In interviews with CSST, Cássius Guimarães Chai, a professor of law at the Federal University of Maranhão in Brazil, and Nadia Helmy, an associate professor of political science at Beni Suef University in Egypt, shared their perspectives on these critical issues.

No country left behind in AI governance

Every major technological revolution in history—from the steam engine and electricity to the internet—has taken decades to spread through society. AI, by contrast, is now reshaping the world on a monthly basis. When technology advances faster than institutions can adapt, how should the international community respond? And can this transformation ensure that the benefits of AI reach every country rather than becoming a new source of division?

Chai argued that global AI governance should not rest with a single authority overseeing the entire system. Instead, it should take the form of a coordinated, polycentric structure in which universal principles, national sovereignty, regional cooperation, scientific expertise, and the rights of affected populations reinforce one another. This vision, he noted, aligns closely with China’s commitment to multilateralism and its support for the United Nations’ central role in global governance.

Just days earlier, the inaugural UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance was held in Geneva on July 6 and 7, bringing participants together to discuss opportunities, divides, security, and human rights. For Helmy, the close timing of the UN dialogue and WAIC 2026 was no coincidence. China’s active engagement in the dialogue, she argued, reflected its commitment to “a community with a shared future for humanity.” She added that recent advances in Chinese AI models—particularly in cost-effectiveness and operational efficiency—have given China a stronger technological foundation from which to help steer global AI governance in a more just and equitable direction.

Toward open, equitable, and secure AI governance

From the restructuring of industrial chains and shifts in labor markets to changes in knowledge production and the digitalization of public services, AI is reshaping nearly every aspect of social life. For developing countries, the immediate challenge is how to avoid being left behind—or denied a voice—in this far-reaching transformation.

Helmy noted that China has released two key documents offering systematic frameworks for addressing this challenge: the “Global AI Governance Initiative,” issued in 2023, and the “Global AI Governance Action Plan,” released in 2025.

“AI governance should not be dominated by a handful of states or technology oligarchs in rule-making,” Helmy commented. “It must reserve equal space for participation and voice for all countries. That is precisely why many emerging market countries are willing to engage actively—they see a departure from traditional models of technology governance.”

Conceptual advances are now being matched by greater technological openness. The rapid growth of China’s open-source ecosystem is translating the governance vision of “AI for Good and for All” and “inclusiveness” into tangible, accessible technological options. Helmy observed that, unlike closed systems dominated by a small number of tech giants, Chinese open-source models offer distinct advantages in cost, performance, and adaptability. For the first time, developing countries have a realistic path to tailoring AI tools to their own languages, cultures, and development priorities—allowing them to move from passive technology recipients to active participants and creators.

Chai argued that the call to “prevent creating new historical injustice in AI” strikes at the very essence of the digital divide. That divide, he stressed, extends far beyond internet access, encompassing computing power, electricity, semiconductors, data, research funding, engineering talent, local-language models, cybersecurity, and the capacity to audit AI systems. A country lacking these capabilities, he warned, will remain structurally dependent within the knowledge economy even when it has access to foreign AI services.

Chai also addressed export controls: “Export controls and technology restrictions have their legitimacy under strictly defined circumstances, particularly when there is credible evidence of cyber risks or serious rights violations. The problem arises, however, when national security is stretched into a vaguely defined category used to protect technological advantages, restrict scientific exchange, and even impose costs on third countries unrelated to the initial dispute. That logic warrants vigilance. The ethical and security principles in the field of AI should apply symmetrically to all countries.”

International cooperation facilitates AI capacity-building

A major institutional development took place on the eve of WAIC 2026: the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) was established in Shanghai, with 29 countries signing on as founding members. For Helmy, this marked a clear progression from policy initiatives within the UN framework to the creation of a formal intergovernmental organization, a sign that China is turning its commitment to bridging the digital divide from policy documents into a practical platform where all countries can participate on an equal footing. She described WAICO as an international public good—free of political conditions, not driven by profit, and designed to give developing countries an institutionalized voice through multilateral consultation.

The establishment of WAICO represents an important institutional milestone. For Chai, however, the deeper significance lies in the changing conception of AI governance itself. He observed that China is gradually shifting the focus of global AI governance from the formulation of safety rules toward building the infrastructure needed for technological autonomy. In his view, the true test of meaningful international cooperation is whether participating countries emerge with greater scientific autonomy, stronger legal safeguards, and a wider range of sovereign choices than they had before. China’s approach, he noted, does not ask Global South countries to choose among competing governance models. Rather, it supports them in developing the institutional capacity and industrial foundations needed to chart their own course.

The United Nations has already produced concrete institutional outcomes in this direction. In July 2024, the 78th UN General Assembly adopted the resolution “Enhancing International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of Artificial Intelligence.” Proposed by China and co-sponsored by more than 140 countries, it established AI capacity building as a global concern rather than a form of optional technical assistance. The “Global Digital Compact” subsequently provided a political foundation, while the UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance brought states and other stakeholders into a universal forum addressing capacity gaps, open-source models, human rights, accountability, interoperability, and access to computing resources.

At WAIC 2026, the National Development and Reform Commission, together with other government departments, released an action plan on AI cooperation and development. The document sets out a comprehensive range of initiatives covering data, computing power, ecosystems, talent, rules, governance, ethics, and related areas.

Helmy described the plan as timely, arguing that it would help extend the benefits of AI to more countries while offering developing economies a practical point of reference. She paid particular attention to its call for jointly building international AI open-source communities and facilitating cross-border exchanges and cooperation. Such efforts, she argued, would enable countries to access technological resources on a more equal footing and shape AI applications around their own priorities. “When countries can localize innovation based on open-source models that align with their own languages and cultures, they gain genuine technological sovereignty,” she said.

Chai likewise highlighted several concrete initiatives launched at WAIC 2026 as measurable and traceable commitments from China. These included plans to provide 5,000 AI training and seminar opportunities for developing countries over the next five years, establish international AI application cooperation centers with multiple multilateral organizations, and roll out the “MAZU” AI-powered meteorological warning system in 30 countries.

In Chai’s view, the “Chair’s Statement of the 2026 WAIC,” issued alongside the conference, offers a useful blueprint for developing countries. Its treatment of data governance, frontier-model safety, the boundaries of autonomous agents, technical standards, employment transitions, environmental impacts, and human oversight provides practical institutional reference points for refining the rules of global AI governance.